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THE BENEFITS OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON
AND THE VIRTUES OF SIMPLICITY:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR ELMENDORF
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
In a recent Article,1 I describe and defend a longstanding substantive
canon of statutory interpretation, which I dub “the Democracy Canon.”2 The
Canon calls upon courts to liberally construe election statutes under certain
circumstances so as to favor enfranchisement of the voter and to maximize voter
choice. For example, a court applying the Canon could order election officials to
count a vote cast by a voter who used a check mark rather than a statutorilymandated “x” to indicate the voter’s choice.3 The Canon instructs that a voter’s
minor technical deviations from statutory requirements (or an election official’s
failure to follow statutory procedures) ordinarily should not lead to voter
disenfranchisement.
Though the name “Democracy Canon” is new, the Canon itself has a long
and distinguished pedigree. Indeed, I traced its origin back to at least 1885, when
the Supreme Court of Texas recognized that “[a]ll statutes tending to limit the
citizen in the exercise of [the right of suffrage] should be liberally construed in his
favor.”4 Since then, it has been applied in myriad state courts, by judges of all
political and ideological stripes, to deal with a wide variety of election
administration issues.5 Many state legislatures have seen fit to codify the Canon,
providing for liberal construction of various election administration statutes.6 For
reasons explained in my Article and revisited below, I believe the Canon is a
sound one and that its use should be extended to federal courts.7 At the very least,
*

William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks
to Chris Elmendorf, Ethan Leib, Luke McLoughlin and Dan Tokaji for useful comments and
suggestions.
1
Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009).
2
A substantive canon is a rule of statutory interpretation based in policy. Such canons “reflect
judicially-based policy concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of how to treat statutory
text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common law
practices, or specific statutorily based policies.” James J. Brudney & Corey Dislear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005).
3
Hasen, supra note 1, at 84-85 (describing Fallon v. Dwyer, 90 N.E. 942 (N.Y. 1910).
4
Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 1885 WL 7221, at *7 (1885).
5
Hasen, supra note 1, at 83-86.
6
Id. at 79 n.49.
7
Id. Pts. II, III.

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532424
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532424

2

HASEN DEMOCRACY CANON REPLY

federal courts should not find constitutional problems when a state court, which
has relied upon the Canon consistently in the past, applies it to resolve a pending
election dispute.8
In this issue of the Cornell Law Review, Professor Christopher S.
Elmendorf provides a thoughtful and detailed Response to my Article.9
Sandwiched between praise for my Article at the beginning and end of his
Response,10 however, is a sustained attack on my argument for the Democracy
Canon. Professor Elmendorf worries that the Canon “could provide a varnish of
legality for far-fetched interpretations of the federal election statutes.”11 He states
that my arguments in defense of the Canon “are so tenuous that one wonders
whether” they are the true reasons I defend the Canon. He argues the Canon
cannot be defended on “good results” grounds because election law cases always
involve tradeoffs among competing values.12 He says that the Canon will
exacerbate tension in the judiciary, leading to more partisan judicial
decisionmaking.13 He also suggests that application of the Canon on the federal
level is likely to lead to less bipartisan election legislation in Congress.14 The best
he can say about the Canon is that (continued) court application of it would not be
“disastrous.”15
Professor Elmendorf then spends more than half of his Response offering
three alternative canons of interpretation in statutory election law cases which he
claims are “more normatively defensible and less politically treacherous” than the
Democracy Canon.16 Professor Elmendorf concedes that his leading alternative
proposed canon, the Effective Accountability Canon (the EA Canon), has not
been adopted by any court and has been rejected repeatedly by the Supreme Court
in its constitutional variant.17 Grounding the EA Canon in a number of
constitutional provisions, most importantly the Guarantee Clause, Professor
Elmendorf advocates use of the EA Canon to interpret statutes to (1) insure that
the voting public is representative of the group of people entitled to vote; (2)
improve the aggregate competence of the voting public to make decisions about
which candidates retrospectively and prospectively act in the voters’ interest; and
8

Id., Pt. IV. In his Response to my Article, Professor Elmendorf does not comment upon this
aspect of my Article, which I consider to be among its most important points.
9
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2010). Professor Elmendorf’s Response is almost as long as my original Article.
10
Id. at ___ [3] (calling Article “important”); id. at ___ [49] (calling Article “terrific”).
11
Id. at ___ [4].
12
Id. at ___ [5].
13
Id. at ___ [6].
14
Id. at ___ [13-14].
15
Id. at ___ [16].
16
Id. at ___ [4].
17
Id. at ___ [34-35].
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(3) facilitate coordination among like-minded voters. If accepted by courts, the
EA Canon could be used interpret ambiguous statutes to attack everything from
the timing of elections to the drawing of electoral districts, to the existence of
nonpartisan elections, and much more.18
There is an ethereal feel to Professor Elmendorf’s Response. He would
throw out an accepted tool of statutory interpretation that has been used since
1885 in many states by judges of varied political persuasions in favor of a
convoluted, complex alternative that has never been accepted by any court, that
would be more disruptive of the political system than the Democracy Canon has
been, and that would be more prone to partisan manipulation than the Democracy
Canon. In short, Professor Elmendorf would replace tradition and simplicity with
ivory tower complexity, and replace a canon with a proven track record with one
that courts would struggle to understand, much less apply.
This brief Reply makes three principal points. First, the Democracy
Canon is eminently defensible on normative grounds as protecting voters’ rights.
It does not suffer from the defects Professor Elmendorf describes. Importantly it
has not exacerbated partisan tensions among the judiciary; to the contrary, the
Canon can serve to diffuse partisan tension. Professor Elmendorf confuses the
“access versus integrity” debate, which breaks down along Democrat-Republican
lines, with application of the Democracy Canon, which does not.
Second, extension of the Democracy Canon to federal courts is unlikely to
change the nature of Congressional dealmaking in the election administration
arena. Congressional Republicans are unlikely to avoid passing election law
legislation that might be subject to the Canon because the Canon could be just as
advantageous to presumed Republican interests as to Democratic interests;
imagine, for example, judicial application of the Canon to a statute governing the
counting of military overseas ballots. Likely the possibility of the Canon’s
deployment by the federal judiciary would have no effect on Congressional
dealmaking.
Third, courts are more likely to accept proposals for rules governing the
judicial role in resolving election law disputes if the proposals are simple and
grounded in historical practice and political reality. For this reason, the
Democracy Canon shows far more promise than the EA Canon in structuring
judicial review of election law statutes. Far from being near-“disastrous,” the
Democracy Canon’s extension to federal courts should be a welcome
development.

18

Id. at ___ [36-38] (footnotes omitted).
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I.
DEFENDING THE DEMOCRACY CANON
Part II of my Article provides a detailed defense of the Democracy Canon
as a tool of statutory interpretation, and Part III deals with the most significant
objection to its application: a worry about the role the Canon could play in further
politicizing the judiciary, which has already shown itself politicized over certain
election law disputes. I do not repeat that extensive defense in this Reply.
Instead, in this Part I respond to Professor Elmendorf’s three main criticisms of
the use of the Democracy Canon. First, he claims that the Democracy Canon
cannot be justified as a means of enforcing an underenforced constitutional norm,
on “good results” grounds, or on preference-elicitation grounds. Second, he
claims that extension of the Democracy Canon will increase partisanship in the
judiciary. Third, he claims that the use of the Canon in federal courts will lead to
“far-fetched” interpretations of federal election statutes. I save until the next part
of this Reply a response to Professor Elmendorf’s other claim, that the federal
court use of the Democracy Canon is likely to deter future bipartisan election
administration legislation.
Justifications for Use of the Canon. As I explained in The Democracy
Canon,19 the rationale for the Democracy Canon as a tool for interpreting election
statutes is straightforward. The Canon’s stated purposes usually are described in
terms of its role in fostering democracy. Its purpose is “to give effect to the will
of the majority and to prevent the disfranchisement of legal voters.”20 It plays a
role in “favoring free and competitive elections.”21 It recognizes that the right to
vote “is a part of the very warp and woof of the American ideal and is a right
protected by both the constitutions of the United States and of the state.”22
Liberal construction of election laws serves “to allow the greatest scope for public
participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to
allow parties to put their candidate on the ballot, and most importantly to allow
voters a choice on Election Day.”23
These lofty ideals as expressed by numerous state courts across
generations resonate in the U.S. Constitution’s protection of the ideal of voter
equality. Although that ideal has been expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in many cases, such as those recognizing the unconstitutionality of poll
19

Hasen, supra note 1, at 77.
Montgomery v. Henry, 39 So. 507, 508 (1905).
21
State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 598 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ohio 1992).
22
State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio. 1948).
23
Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1991).
20
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taxes24 and the requirement of districts of equal population,25 it is a norm that has
been underenforced by the courts, most recently in Bush v. Gore26 and Crawford
v. Marion County Elections Board.27 Simply put, the courts have not enforced
any constitutional right to vote as broad as the rhetoric about constitutional values
in the Supreme Court’s cases. The Democracy Canon therefore can enforce these
underenforced constitutional norms through statutory interpretation.28 Even if the
Supreme Court has not always strongly accepted the norms behind the canon,
they have both popular support as well as support in state courts and state
legislatures. The Supreme Court has no monopoly on determining which
constitutional values it chooses not to fully enforce may be enforced more
strongly by other judicial, legislative, and executive actors.
Professor Elmendorf’s attack on this underenforcement argument is
curious. He calls this rationale “tenuous”29 and “wonders whether the true reason
that Hasen favors the Democracy Canon is because he personally subscribes to
the values the Canon embodies.”30 Professor Elmendorf has drawn a false
dichotomy: the reason I put forward the underenforcement argument is because I
believe the constitutional values which are underenforced deserve greater
enforcement. This is no different from a scholar who favors the rule of lenity as a
tool of statutory interpretation out of a belief that prosecutors have too much
discretion in choosing criminals to prosecute,31 or who favors use of the
avoidance canon because it allows the Supreme Court to advance a more liberal
understanding of constitutional rights at a time when conventional politics has
become suspicious of expanded rights for disfavored groups and individuals.32 In
short, the underenforcement and “good results” arguments overlap.
Professor Elmendorf further argues that the Democracy Canon is
unnecessary because there is no underenforcement of the constitutional right to
vote. He claims that the Supreme Court has taken a “big step” toward full
enforcement of constitutional voting rights in its recent Crawford case.33 This
argument is unconvincing.
As Professor Elmendorf himself has noted
24

Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
26
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
27
128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008).
28
Hasen, supra note 1, at 98-100.
29
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [5].
30
Id.
31
Philip p. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1
J. LEGIS & PUB. POL’Y 105, 129 (1997).
32
Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process
Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397
(2005).
33
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [18].
25
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elsewhere,34 Crawford contains no majority opinion and it provides no solid
guidance for lower courts to adjudicate constitutional challenges to garden-variety
election laws. Indeed, Professor Elmendorf identifies five separate ways that a
lower court might interpret the rule of Crawford, including some variations under
which plaintiffs have virtually no chance of succeeding in vindicating their
constitutional claims.35 While there is some uncertainty as to the future use of
Crawford by lower courts and the Supreme Court, the opinion (which does not
even reference Bush v. Gore’s aspirational statement about the unconstitutionality
of valuing one person’s vote over that of another36) hardly eliminates two
centuries of court constitutional underenforcement of voting rights. To the
contrary, Crawford is a brand new decision from a conservative Supreme Court
which generally does not seem intent on expanding voting rights;37 Professor
Elmendorf points to no evidence showing lower courts relying upon the case to
expand the constitutional rights of voters.38
Professor Elmendorf also claims that defending the Democracy Canon on
“good results” grounds is problematic, because there will always be tradeoffs
among competing values in election law cases, and there is no reason to favor the
enfranchisement of voters over other values, such as reducing the fiscal costs of
election administration.39 To begin with, often there will not need to be a tradeoff
among competing values. Consider again a court’s decision under the Democracy
Canon to allow a “check mark” rather than a statutorily-commanded “x” to count
as a valid vote. It is hard to imagine important competing values on the other side
of such a decision, at least so long as the courts have been applying a longstanding rule to use the Canon in appropriate cases.40 In additions, courts or
legislatures often have shown themselves willing make the tradeoff among
34

Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the Constitutional
Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
507 (2008).
35
Id. at 536-37.
36
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (“Having one granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of
another.”).
37
Hasen, supra note 1, at 99-100.
38
On the practical difficulties of courts doing so, see Julien Kern, “As-Applied” Constitutional
Challenges, Class Actions, and Other Strategies: Potential Solutions to Challenging Voter
Identification Laws after Crawford, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2009).
39
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [22]. He lists eight “likely” “shared values” which might need
to be traded off against the Democracy Canon.
40
As I explain in Part IV of The Democracy Canon, serious due process concerns may arise when
a court uses the Democracy Canon for the first time in a disputed election, thereby changing the
rules of the game as they existed on election day. For more on this “lawlessness” principle, see
Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Lawlessness Principle: A Comment on Professor Amar,
61 FLA. L. REV. 979 (2009).
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competing values by adopting the Democracy Canon as a default rule. When a
legislature enacts the Democracy Canon through a statutory rule of
interpretation,41 it represents a democratically-enacted decision to favor the
interests of voters’ enfranchisement over other competing interests in election
administration. When courts adopt the Canon as a common law principle, they
adopt a default rule likely favored by voters behind a veil of ignorance, a rule
which nonetheless is subject to legislative override by the democratically-elected
legislature. The Democracy Canon does not privilege the interest of voter
enfranchisement over all interests in every case; but it does provide a starting
point for discussion, with appropriate weight given to a major value in democratic
society, voter enfranchisement.42
Professor Elmendorf also takes issue with my other argument for the
Democracy Canon, that it will be “preference-eliciting.”43 Under the preference
elicitation argument, if a legislature wishes to pass an election law that would not
be subject to the Democracy Canon, and would be read strictly so as not to
maximize voter enfranchisement, it can pass a law to overcome a default judicial
application of the Democracy Canon.44 In other words, judicial adoption of the
Democracy Canon will spur the Legislature to override it in appropriate cases.
Professor Elmendorf is skeptical that courts will be able to quickly and
reliably respond to judicial applications of the Democracy Canon.45 Here,
Professor Elmendorf misunderstands the nature of the court-legislature
interaction. As I repeatedly explained in my Article,46 the Legislature may act ex
ante in exempting certain election laws from the Democracy Canon when the
legislature desires to do so. For example, generally speaking, both the Colorado
Supreme Court and the Colorado Legislature have embraced the Democracy
41

Hasen, supra note 1, at 49 n.79.
Courts wisely have avoided applying the Democracy Canon in cases in which serious
allegations of fraud have arisen. In such cases, the danger of lenient interpretation of election
laws is that it could facilitate fraudulent activity. In the absence of such concerns, however, there
is nothing wrong with privileging voters’ rights over other concerns, such as the costs of election
administration.
Professor Elmendorf worries that the fraud exception to the Democracy Canon’s
application could eviscerate the rule, because it is hard to know when fraud exists and allegations
of fraud are quite common. Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [23 n.80]. Though it may be true
that allegations of fraud are quite common after a close election, courts are usually quite adept at
dismissing frivolous claims of fraud when made in election contests.
43
See Hasen, supra note 1, at 100-03 (setting forth preference elicitation argument).
44
See id.
45
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ n. 72 [20]. He says that legislatures may do so when there is
unified government control and the decision works against the governing party’s interests or when
the decision disadvantages incumbents of all stripes.
46
See Hasen, supra note 1, at 106, 122.
42

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532424

8

HASEN DEMOCRACY CANON REPLY

Canon.47 But the Colorado legislature wrote a statute dealing with filling
vacancies before an election to provide in unmistakable terms that vacancies shall
not be filled when a vacancy occurs within eighteen days of the general election.48
By doing so, the Colorado legislature overrode the default Democracy Canon in a
particular instance where other interests (such as the interest in efficient
administration and prevention of voter confusion in the weeks before the election)
trump voters’ rights to vote in a truly competitive election.
The Colorado example shows that it does not take legislative
omniscience49 for a legislature in a Democracy Canon jurisdiction to realize it
needs to use clear, firm language if it wants courts not to apply the Canon. Of
course, many legislatures appear to like application of the Democracy Canon,
which is why so many Legislatures have codified it, and perhaps why legislatures
such as the New Jersey legislature have not changed their laws in response to
aggressive judicial application of the Canon.50
The Democracy Canon and Judicial Partisanship. Professor Elmendorf
notes the “access versus integrity” debate between Democrats and Republicans, in
which Democrats favor rules (such as election day registration) that are meant to
increase the number of eligible voters and Republicans favor rules that are meant

47

See id. at 86 n.78 (quoting Colorado Supreme Court decision extending Democracy Canon to
absentee ballot legislation); id. at 79 n.49 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-103(1) (2008) (“This
code shall be liberally construed so that all eligible voters may be permitted to vote and those who
are not eligible electors may be kept from voting in order to prevent fraud and corruption in
elections”)).
48
See id. at 108 & n.198 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-1002(2.5)(A) (WEST 2002)).
49
Cf. Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [11] (“But in point of fact, legislators are not omniscient
and they draft statutes under terrific time pressures…”). In addition, as Professor Elmendorf
concedes, id. at ___ [15], there is no reason to believe that “agenda-displacement costs”—i.e., the
costs to the legislature to override judicial errors in statutory interpretation—are greater with the
Democracy Canon than any other principle of statutory interpretation.
50
See Hasen, supra note 1, at 110 (“Indeed, despite criticism of the Samson opinion, the New
Jersey Legislature has not amended its vacancy statute to impose clearer language.”). Professor
Elmendorf dismisses the partisan unity in Samson on grounds that the case involved replacing a
candidate due to a late vacancy, and not an issue of vote counting. Elmendorf, supra note 9, at
___ [11]. But Samson arose in a highly-charged political atmosphere in which Republicans
accused the state Supreme Court of acting in an absurd an unjustified way. Hasen, supra note 1,
at 108-09.
Professor Elmendorf also suggests that the fact that legislatures do not overrule court
application of the Democracy Canon “does not establish that the Canon has any substantive
benefits.” Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [20]. True, but the fact that many legislatures codify
the Canon demonstrates that at least some legislatures see the benefits of the Canon as a default
rule, and likely at least some other legislatures do not bother codifying the Canon, even though
they like it, because it is an already-established judicial rule.
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to deter election fraud (such as voter identification requirements).51 He then
claims that the Democracy Canon takes sides in this debate, by favoring the
Democrats:52 “In an era in which the two major political parties are locked in
combat over the extent to which barriers to voter participation or opportunities for
voter fraud represent the greater threat to democracy, a tool of statutory
interpretation that amounts to a thumb on the scale, of indeterminate magnitude,
in favor of voter participation, seems likely to increase both the ‘partisan gap’ in
judicial decision-making and the media drumbeat concerning judicial partisanship
in election cases.”53
Professor Elmendorf’s claim is belied by the evidence of the application of
the Democracy Canon in state courts. Consider the controversial Samson
opinion,54 described in Part III of my Article. In that case, application of the
Democracy Canon favored Democrats, and the unanimous opinion was joined by
all the court’s justices, including four Democrats, two Republicans, and an
independent.55 Or consider the pair of 2008 Ohio election law cases that I
describe in the introduction of my Article.56 In both cases, a unanimous Ohio
Supreme Court (made up entirely of Republican judges) relied upon the
Democracy Canon in ruling on two election challenges: one ruling favored
Democrats and the other favored Republicans.57 If courts are dividing along
partisan lines over application of the Democracy Canon, I have not seen it.
The reason that there is not a Democratic valence to the Democracy
Canon is no mystery: there is no a priori reason to believe that Democrats are
more likely than Republicans to want to rely upon the Canon. Republicans are
just as likely to face a last-minute vacancy to be filled before an election as
Democrats,58 and a Republican is just as likely to be on the wrong side of a razorthin election as a Democrat and wish to invoke the Democracy Canon.

51

Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___, ___ [6, 11]. I have written extensively about this emerging
divide in Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2007).
52
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at __ [5-6] (“The Democracy Canon privileges a couple of these
values to the exclusion of others, and it does so in a manner that risks at least the appearance of
judicial partiality toward one of the two major political parties (the Democrats).”).
53
Id. at ___ [10].
54
N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002).
55
Hasen, supra note 1, at 107. So much for Professor Elmendorf’s statement that “it would be
quite surprising if Democratic and Republican judges were able to converge on shared
understandings about when the Canon is properly triggered.” Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [9].
56
Hasen, supra note 1, at 70-71 (describing State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 896 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio
2008) and Myles v. Bruner, 899 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 2008)).
57
See id. at 79-80.
58
Consider the recent questionable case in which the Fifth Circuit held that Texas law, read in
light of the Constitution’s qualifications clause, barred Republicans from replacing Congressman

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532424

10

HASEN DEMOCRACY CANON REPLY

In the latter category consider the Coleman-Franken dispute in Minnesota.
There, Republican Norm Coleman, slightly behind Democrat Al Franken after a
manual recount in the 2008 U.S. Senate race in the state, relied upon the
Democracy Canon in arguing that the state must count non-complying absentee
ballots.59 Though it was somewhat entertaining to election law aficionados to
hear Coleman’s Republican lawyers raising “access” arguments and Franken’s
Democratic lawyers raising “integrity” arguments, the truth of the matter is that in
a close election a candidate’s lawyer raises whatever argument may help her
client win the election contest, even if it does not line up with the party’s official
ideology.
In my Article, I recognized that there is a danger that judges could
selectively use (or appear to use) the Democracy Canon to reach a particular
political outcome.60 But that is not a risk that applies to only Democratic judges.
It exists whenever a canon of construction leaves some play in the joints for
statutory interpretation. I hope that my original Article explained why the risk is
worth the candle, and how consistent court application of the Democracy Canon,
coupled with ex ante legislative override of the default Canon in appropriate
circumstances, can minimize this danger of politicization of the Canon. Indeed,
when courts consistently apply the Canon, it can minimize political tension by
showing that voters of all stripes get the same benefit of the Canon: sometimes it
will help Democratic interests, sometimes Republican interests, and sometimes
the interests of others. At its core is protection of voter enfranchisement rights. If
in the end that concept lines up more with the rhetoric of Democrats rather than
Republicans, it does not seem to affect court application of the Canon.
The Democracy Canon and Far-Fetched Interpretations of Federal
Statutes. Professor Elmendorf argues against the extension of the Democracy
Canon to federal courts because the Canon “could provide a varnish of legality
Tom DeLay on the ballot in 2006. Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir.
2006).
59
Though Minnesota had a tradition of generally applying the Democracy Canon in election law
disputes, it remained in the minority of states refusing to apply the Canon to issues related to
absentee ballots. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 86. In the Coleman-Franken dispute, the state
supreme court relied upon this history in rejecting Coleman’s argument for use of the Democracy
Canon in this dispute, stating that the proper treatment of ballots deviating from statutory absentee
ballot requirements “is a policy determination for the legislature, not this court, to make.” In re
Contest of Gen. Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, for the Purpose of Electing a U.S. Senator from
Minn., 787 N.W.2d 453, 462 n.11 (Minn. 2009). Had the state Supreme Court ruled otherwise
for Coleman, by adopting the Democracy Canon for the first time for absentee ballots in the
course of resolving a disputed election, it could have raised due process concerns. See Hasen,
supra note 1, at 118-22.
60
See id. at 119.
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for far-fetched interpretations of the federal election statutes.”61 The claim is
unsupported. Most applications of the Democracy Canon are entirely routine,
such as the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent unanimous ruling that Ohio election
officials should accept absentee ballot applications prepared by the McCain
campaign even if voters did not check a box affirming citizenship inadvertently
placed on the form by the McCain campaign and not required by state law.62 Farfetched? What about an order to count hand-marked ballots when the voters did
not draw their lines perfectly straight as required by state law,63 or a requirement
to count ballots marked by voters with the names of the candidates’ political
parties, despite a statutory prohibition on counting ballots containing any “mark”
or other information?64 These cases are well within the judicial mainstream of
statutory interpretation. None of the cases show judges engaging in far-fetched,
implausible interpretations.
The only example Professor Elmendorf gives of a potential far-fetched
interpretation of federal election law involves suggestions that “left-leaning”
judges could read the Help America Vote Act in ways that would contradict the
intentions of Congress.65 Yet he points to no statutory language under HAVA
that could allow courts applying the Canon fairly to reach these contorted results.
Nor does he point to any state cases applying the Canon in similar circumstances.
Indeed, of the three most controversial cases applying the Democracy Canon that
I discuss in my Article,66 Professor Elmendorf says nothing about two of them,
and agrees with the result in the third, the New Jersey Samson case.67
In short, a spate of “far-fetched” interpretations of federal election statutes
by (presumably Democratically-appointed) federal judges applying the
Democracy Canon seems unlikely to materialize. The same arguments which
have sustained the Democracy Canon in state courts for at least 125 years apply in
favor of the Canon’s extension to federal courts.

61

Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [4].
Myles v. Bruner, 899 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 2008).
63
Fallon v. Dwyer, 90 N.E. 942 (N.Y. 1910).
64
State ex rel. Law v. Saxon, 12 So. 218, 224-25 (Fla. 1892).
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II.
A FEDERAL DEMOCRACY CANON AND ITS LIKELY EFFECT
ON FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
Apart from arguments about the potential negative effects of the
Democracy Canon’s application on the courts, Professor Elmendorf argues that
the Canon’s extension to federal courts will deter Congress from passing future
bipartisan election administration legislation. In this Part, I explain why this
latter concern is unwarranted.
Professor Elmendorf’s argument builds upon the work of Professors Dan
Rodriguez and Barry Weingast.68 Roughly speaking, they argue that the passage
of legislation requires legislative leaders to secure the votes of “pivotal
legislators” who could vote for or against the bill. To secure these votes, leaders
need to make credible statements to the pivotal legislators about ambiguous
language or gaps in the proposed legislation. After the legislation passes, courts
are called upon to interpret this ambiguous language or to fill in gaps in the
legislation. Professors Rodriguez and Weingast advocate that courts “enforce the
legislative deal” by interpreting the statute in line with the preferences of the
“pivotal legislators.” When courts instead adopt an “expansionist” view of
ambiguous language, as the authors claim the Supreme Court did in reading
portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they make it less likely that pivotal
legislators will pass future legislation. In other words, if pivotal legislators know
that the courts will not enforce legislative deals, and will instead interpret the
statute in a way consistent with the views of its most ardent supporters, they will
be less likely to enter into future deals.
Professor Elmendorf’s extension of these ideas to the election
administration arena is straightforward. Republicans will not sign on to bipartisan
legislative deals on election administration without a “belief that courts would
enforce the gist of the deal. If Republican Senators and Representative knew that
there was a special ‘pro voter’ canon of interpretation [that] could be trolled out
by liberal judges to construe the inevitable imperfections of legislative drafting in
a manner that undermines the legislative deal, they would fight tooth and nail
against bills that even modestly liberalize the terms of voter participation…”69
I am quite dubious of the general Rodriguez/Weingast positive claim that
expansionist interpretations of statutes by the judiciary decrease the volume of
legislation passed by Congress. To me it is just as plausible that pivotal legislators
will simply demand clearer language in order to secure their votes, assuming they
68

Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory
Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007).
69
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [13-14].
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even pay attention at all to the scope of judicial interpretations of statutes. I hope
to write more about my skepticism elsewhere, but for the sake of argument in this
Reply, I will accept the Rodriguez/Weingast general claim.
Even given the correctness of the Rodriguez/Weingast claim, I do not
believe application of the Democracy Canon in federal courts to federal election
statutes would deter Congress from passing future bipartisan election
administration legislation. As explained in Part I of this Reply, Republicans are
just as likely as Democrats to benefit from application of the Democracy Canon in
election administration court cases. Indeed, just a few months ago, Congress
passed the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act,70 which expands the
rights of military and other overseas voters to cast a vote that will be counted in
federal elections. Conventional wisdom is that military votes skew Republican,
and so application of the Democracy Canon to this statute could help, rather than
hinder, Republican self-interest.
Moreover, if Republicans were so averse to voter enfranchisement claims,
it is unclear why they would have voted for a “Sense of Congress” resolution in
the 2001 amendment to UOCAVA stating that “all eligible American voters,
regardless of race, ethnicity, disability, the language they speak, or the resources
of the community in which they live, should have an equal opportunity to cast a
vote and to have that vote counted.”71 A Republican majority worried about
“liberal judges” deciding election administration cases with a “pro-voter” bias
certainly would not have given such judges a hook to upon which to hang such a
pro-voter interpretation.
Finally, since 2000 it has proven to be difficult as a general matter to pass
bipartisan election administration legislation.72 Professor Elmendorf has not
shown that a canon of statutory interpretation that might apply to certain disputes

70

P.L. 111-84, §§ 575-89, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/21814319/Military-andOverseas-Voter-Empowerment-Act.
71
Pub. L. No. 107-107, div. A, titl. XVI, § 1601, 115 Stat. 1274 (2001). The language was
approved as part of a broader defense appropriations bill. When that appropriations bill was
considered in the Senate, Republican Senator Allard initially proposed an amendment expressing
a sense of the Senate about the importance of protecting the voting rights of uniformed voters.
See S.Amend.1755 to S.1438, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SP01755:. The
amendment did not include the language quoted in the text above. Instead, the quoted language
was added by a bipartisan House-Senate conference, H. Rpt. 107-333, § 1601,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp107:FLD010:@1%28hr333%29:. Republicans in the
House voted for the final bill including the quoted language by a vote of 174 in favor to 34
opposed. All Republican Senators but one (Senator McCain) voted for the final bill,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&sessi
on=1&vote=00369. One Republican Senator did not vote.
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involving some aspects of election legislation is likely to have anything more than
a negligible effect on the chances of future election legislation passing.

III.
JUDICIAL DECISION RULES IN ELECTION CASES
AND THE BENEFITS OF SIMPLICITY
In addition to Professor Elmendorf’s many arguments against the
Democracy Canon, he uses more than half of his response to offer three
alternative canons of interpretation in statutory election law cases which he
claims are “more normatively defensible and less politically treacherous” than the
Democracy Canon.73 He spends a full-third of his Response, [16] pages, on one of
the three canons, the Effective Accountability Canon (“the EA Canon”).74 My
purpose in this Part is to show that the EA Canon is less normatively defensible
and more politically treacherous than the Democracy Canon.
Consider some of the great benefits of the Democracy Canon already
explored. It is simple and easily understood: courts should interpret unclear
statutes to favor the voters. Judges and lay people can understand a rule that says
that someone who cannot draw a straight line in filling in a ballot should still have
her vote counted despite a law providing for ballots to be marked with two
straight lines. The Canon has been applied consistently by many state courts by
judges of all ideological persuasions for 125 years. The Canon reinforces a
popular underenforced constitutional norm to favor the enfranchisement of voters
and their chance to vote in competitive elections. The Canon, once established,
can provide a baseline for judges of various ideologies to apply to election
statutes. Legislatures that do not want voter-enfranchising interpretations of
statutes in particular cases can draft around the default rule. The Canon is
unlikely to lead to far-fetched interpretation of election statutes.
Now consider the EA Canon. It is hard for me to briefly describe the EA
Canon; indeed, I had to read Professor Elmendorf’s description numerous times
before I could understand it.75 It appears that Professor Elmendorf advocates use
73

Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [4].
His “Carrington canon” would call upon courts to construe statutes narrowly that were passed
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of the EA Canon to interpret ambiguous statutes to (1) insure that the voting
public is representative of the group of people entitled to vote; (2) improve the
aggregate competence of the voting public to make decisions about which
candidates retrospectively and prospectively act in the voters’ interest; and (3)
facilitate coordination among like-minded voters.
The vices of such a canon of interpretation are many. First, the canon is
complex and abstract. How are courts to know what improves “aggregate
competence of the voting public”? How is a court to implement a “presumptive
preference for the regime under which the demographics of the persons who vote
better mirror those of the entire normative electorate?”76 Apparently, in making
these judicial determinations, courts “would have to wade through and adjudicate
disputes among political scientists about the actual or likely effects of alternative
institutional arrangements.”77 Professor Elmendorf assures us that if courts get
these wrong, it is no matter, as “judicial mistakes would be subject to correction
by the legislature or an implementing agency.”78 He does not explain why the
“agenda displacement” and other costs he associated with legislative override of
the Democracy Canon would not apply at least as strongly with respect to judicial
determinations under the EA Canon.
Make no mistake: the EA Canon would be difficult to apply, and the
outcome of challenges brought in reliance on the EA Canon difficult to predict.
Not every court applying the statute will be stacked with former law professors
The very idea of democracy presupposes a normative electorate to which public officials
are ultimately accountable. Although the normative electorate must be defined in a
manner that gives it a fair claim to speaking for the citizenry as a whole, reasonable
people may disagree about the propriety of one or another voter qualification (consider
the status of felons). There is also ample room for debate about what offices should be
elective, the frequency of elections, the separation or consolidation of governmental
powers, the scope for directly democratic lawmaking, the constitutional entrenchment of
preferred rights, and more. Bracketing these large normative questions, however, we can
say that the electoral component of a political order is more or less effective vis-à-vis the
objective of polar accountability depending on (1) the degree to which the persons who
turn out to vote are representative of the normative electorate as a whole; (2) the
aggregate competence of the voting public in apportion blame retrospectively, and,
arguably, in identifying those candidate who are most likely to act as the voters—if fully
informed—would wish for them to act; and (3) the extent to which the electoral system
facilitates or retards effective coordination among like-minded voters.
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [24] (footnotes omitted and original emphasis).
Id. Or consider this constitutional principle Elmendorf advocates: “An election law…is
unconstitutional if there are practicable alternatives that would result in substantially more
effective accountability to the normative electorate as a reasonable cost.” Id. at ___ [25].
77
Id. at ___ [39].
78
Id.
76
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trained in abstract legal theory, and there is no guarantee that theoreticians would
do an especially good job interpreting election statutes. This is especially true
because the rule is inchoate, to be filled with the ideological preferences of the
judges applying it. The EA Canon emerges not from court experience interpreting
statutes, but from Professor Elmendorf’s head, and his (admittedly controversial)
reading of the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution.79 Indeed, Professor
Elmendorf concedes that the EA Canon has not been adopted by any court, and it
has been rejected repeatedly by the Supreme Court in its constitutional variant.80
Despite the fact that the EA Canon has no tradition or pedigree, and it not
easily understood, its application apparently could be very far-reaching, much
further reaching than the Democracy Canon. Professor Elmendorf claims that in
its constitutional manifestation the Effective Accountability norm could “be used
to attack the timing of elections; the drawing of electoral districts, the existence of
nonpartisan elections; the choice between districted and at-large elections; the
provisions (or lack therefore) of information to voters on the ballot, in ballot
pamphlets, or in pre-election mailings; ballot design; state policies that bear on
the privacy or publicity of voting behavior; the variety and extent of campaign
finance restrictions; the location of voting precincts and the provision (or lack
thereof) for county-level ‘vote centers’; the permissibility of national parties
fielding candidates for local office; and perhaps even the issue of ‘full electorate’
elections…”81 Its statutory analogue, the EA Canon, could be used to further
these same goals through interpretation of ambiguous election statutes. Though
Professor Elmendorf seems to believe that courts applying EA norms in statutory
cases will be more restrained than if those who would apply these norms in
constitutional cases, I do not share his confidence.
Despite this breathtaking breadth of the EA Canon, which would be a
great expansion of judicial power in the pursuit of structural interests (and not
voting rights),82 there is no reason to believe that courts applying the EA Canon
would be seen by the public as reaching more legitimate decisions than courts
applying the Democracy Canon. Professor Elmendorf tells us that the
79

Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___[28] (admitting the lack of clarity about the meaning and
enforceability of the Guarantee Clause, but arguing that his analysis “does yield a picture of the
Clause’s meaning that in some respects is clear enough for judicial enforcement through tools of
statutory construction.”) (original emphasis).
80
Id. at ___ [34-35].
81
Id. at ___ [36-38] (footnotes omitted).
82
See, e.g., id. at ___ [40] (“From an accountability perspective, who wins a razor-thin election is
unimportant; the leading vote-getters have proven themselves more or less equally satisfactory to
the voters.”). For my take on the rights-structure debate, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE ch. 5
(2003).
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controversial Samson case would come out the same way under the EA Canon83
as it did under the Democracy Canon, but he also tells us that the public pays
attention to judicial results, not reasoning.84 If application of the Democracy
Canon in Samson could undermine public confidence in the judiciary, why would
the EA Canon not do the same?
Finally, Professor Elmendorf cavalierly predicts (without providing any
evidence) that there would be less judicial partisanship under the EA Canon, as
there are aspects of it that should appeal to Democratic judges and aspects that
appeal to Republican judges.85 This statement appears to be based upon little
more than wishful thinking; in contrast, we have a long tradition of bipartisan
judicial application of the Democracy Canon.
In sum, the EA Canon has fewer normative benefits than the Democracy
Canon and many potential drawbacks. It maximizes judicial power in the name
of promoting certain structural values, without regard to safeguarding individual
voting rights. The EA Canon’s complexity and uncertainty in application
increases the chances the canon could be manipulated for partisan reasons or
misapplied. It is not the kind of judicial rule that would promote confidence in
the judiciary.

CONCLUSION
Professor Elmendorf finds much to criticize in the Democracy Canon, and
argues against its extension to federal courts, despite the Canon’s long pedigree
and consistent application by judges of various parties and ideologies in state
courts. As I have shown here, Professor Elmendorf unduly downplays the
Canon’s benefits and exaggerates the risks attendant with the Canon’s
application. My appreciation for the Democracy Canon has only increased when
I compare the Canon to Professor Elmendorf’s alternative EA Canon.
Empowering courts with something like an EA Canon would be dangerous for the
judiciary, by injecting courts further into the political thicket without clear
guidance or purpose. In this instance, simplicity and tradition in election
adjudication trump novelty and complexity.

83

Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [39-40].
Id. at ___[10].
85
Id. at ___[40] (finding “some basis for hoping that an equilibrium would emerge in which
liberal and conservative judges honor one another’s concerns in cases that implicate the canon”).
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